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This critique of the EC package of proposals on state aid and the implications for public services consists of 
three main sections. 
  
- a presentation of the historical and legal context, and their impact on the expansion of private sector 
activity in the market for public services 
- a critical analysis of the proposals themselves 
- a final section contrasting the route of encouraging competitive tendering with the possibility of 
exempting public services operating in the general interest  
  
2. History and development 
2.1. Level competition in international trade 
The rationale for Article 87 concerning state aid was to prohibit state subsidies that would give the 
company(ies) of a particular country an unfair advantage in the common market of the EU against companies 
from other member states without such a subsidy.  Thus state aid is aid which „distorts competition by 
favouring certain undertakings‟, and is said to be incompatible „as far as it affects trade between member 
states‟ (Art 87.1)   
 
For example, if Belgium subsidised a local car factory, that would give the factory a competitive advantage 
in selling its cars, anywhere in Europe, against non-subsidised factories in Netherlands or Ireland.  Because 
the issue related to a member state trying to gain an unfair advantage for its national companies against the 
companies of other countries, it was also rational to assign special authority to the supra-national body, the 
European Commission, to resolve disputes over when aid could be permitted because of public policy and 
public interest – for example economic development, cohesion, and employment.   
 
While the boundaries between the commercial and public sectors remained clear, the state aid provisions 
could be seen as regulating a specific area of public policy – industrial policy – rather than affecting public 
services in general across the board.   
2.2. Development in relation to public services 
During the 1980s and 1990s there were two key developments which changed the impact of these provisions. 
These were the growing importance of private companies in the state aid processes; and the growth of 
policies favouring privatisation or at least corporatisation of some public services which had previously been 
carried out in-house. 
 
The state aid rules give the EC itself considerable power, and private companies came to realise the 
possibilities for improving their own position by encouraging further use of these powers. Whereas in the 
1980s, the majority of responses and comments on Commission proposals and decisions came from member 
states, by the mid-1990s private companies were making four times as many responses as the member states, 
invariably arguing that the state aid distorted competition and should be disallowed, and the arguments used 
by the companies were often reflected in the final decisions of the Commission. 2 The state aid regime was 
described by one observer as “no longer controlled exclusively or principally in the interests being operated 
less in the interest of other member states, but also, and perhaps even more so, in the interest of the 
competitors of the intended beneficiaries of the aid”.3  The companies thus began to exercise more influence 
over the direction of EC policy, with public services being seen as an increasingly interesting area. 4 
 
Privatisation policies were also developed in the 1980s and 1990s, which encouraged the view that public 
services was a market that could be opened up much more for private business. Since public expenditure is 
invariably involved in public services, the state aid rules provided a mechanism of very general application 
for opening up these markets. This was further reinforced by the growth of corporatisation, creating arms 
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length public sector companies to replace previous in-house or special entities, which was itself partly 
stimulated by a wish to comply with constraints on general government borrowing, including the EU‟s own 
convergence criteria for monetary union. These corporatised entities could be identified as organisations 
separate form the public authorities which owned them, and thus in receipt of finance – or aid – from the 
public authority itself.  
 
The combination of these factors enabled state aid rules to become a tool for private companies to use to 
obtain more business in public services. A good example of this is the role of these rules in a series of actions 
by private companies in relation to municipal operators in the water sector in Italy in 1997 and 1998.  
 
In 1990, the Italian government passed a new law encouraging municipal companies with the special status 
of “aziende municipalizzate” into joint stock companies (SpA): the law provided for income tax concessions 
and soft loans as incentives to do this. Following a new law on water in Italy in 1994 (the “legge Galli”), the 
water sector in Italy started to be restructured, with the possibility of continued municipal operations or 
privatization.  In 1997 an Italian association of private water distributors lodged a complaint with the EC 
under state aid provisions of the treaty, against the incentives provided under the 1990 law: although the 
relevant sectors were not open to competition at the time, the EC ruled that this was unfair state aid. 5  In 
1997 and 1998 private water companies brought other court cases in Italy: one (successful) case claiming 
that municipalities could not choose as partners companies owned by other municipalities, without offering 
the partnership contract for competitive tendering 6; another (unsuccessful) case argued that municipally-
owned companies (SpAs) should not be allowed to operate outside the territory of the municipality which 
owns them 7. And in 1997 private companies successfully blocked a take-over bid from AMGA, Genoa‟s 
municipal utility, for a privately-owned water company operating in the Genoa area, Acquedotto De Ferrari 
Galleria 8.   
 
Thus the use of the state aid laws can be seen as part of a wider corporate strategy to improve the market 
position of private companies vis-à-vis municipal companies. Moreover, the contest is not between 
companies from different countries – the private companies involved in the above cases came from both 
inside Italy and outside – but between the private and public sector.  
 
2.3. Impact on public services and public finance 
Such cases can seriously constrain the capacity of member states to decide for themselves how best to 
structure the public sector in order to achieve public policy objectives.  If a public authority chooses to 
provide a service through a municipal or state company, then any finance provided by the state to those 
companies can be claimed to be state aid, with the onus of proof effectively residing on the public authority 
to justify the finance provided. 9  The powers given to the Commission create further problems of uncertainty 
about whether any given example of state aid will be ruled inadmissible.   
 
The impact is so wide because in principle, the financing of any public service can be challenged under the 
rules. A UK government minister for example has expressed concern over the impact on health services, and 
also supported giving unconditional priority to the needs of the service: “The position of many health and 
education facilities similarly remains unclear and needs to be clarified. If it proves impossible, for example, 
to maintain the line (which we support) that publicly funded hospitals and other deliverers of health services 
are not caught by the State aid rules at all, the Commission should block exempt public funding for health 
services provided to meet a public need.” 10 
 
The EU‟s rules on state aid have even affected the public services policies of neighbouring countries which 
are not member states, by incorporation into trade agreements. On example is the agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA) which extends the EU Single Market to countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and incorporates the wording of the EU article 87 on state aid (EEA article 61).11 In 
1999 Norway‟s system of regional variations in social security contributions was declared unlawful, because 
it was ruled that this system conferred direct competitive advantages on undertakings in the favoured regions 
compared to undertakings located elsewhere.12   
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2.4.  The criteria 
The application of the state aid rules should have been restricted by the various criteria implied in articles 86 
and 87. The services under 86 are described as services of general economic interest, and so it may be 
expected that other „non-economic‟ services are not covered – depending on the interpretation of „economic‟.  
The application of article 87 is limited by „insofar as it affects trade between member states‟, and so one 
might expect that financing of local public services, for example, would always be exempt. However, these 
limitations have not in practice had any significant effect in limiting the application of the state aid rules.  
2.4.1. Economic activity and state subsidies in public services 
The criterion developed by the ECJ to decide if a service is „economic‟ is very broad: any activity is 
economic if it involves offering some service or product in return for some remuneration. This captures a 
very large percentage of public services, since public services are increasingly organised through contracts 
where there is some kind of charge to users – for example prescription charges or university fees – or where 
one public authority provides a service to another public authority, for which it is paid.  If there any such 
contracts or charges in a service, then it is likely that the courts will interpret it as an economic activity. 
 
Apart from charges, the other way of financing public services is through public finance mechanisms - 
raising money through taxes and distributing it to public authorities, without a contract requiring a specific 
service in return. The ECJ has ruled that it is an essential characteristic of public bodies that they should 
receive this kind of public finance: otherwise, “if there is a specific consideration for the state to finance an 
entity, such as a contractual nexus, the Court of Justice suggested that the dependency ties are not 
sufficiently close …. Such a relationship is analogous to the dependency that exists in normal commercial 
relations formed by reciprocal contracts…The existence of a contract between the parties, apart from the 
specific considerations for funding, indicates strongly supply substitutability, in the sense that the entity 
receiving the funding faces competition in the relevant markets”13. In the same case, the ECJ also noted that 
public finance is very similar to subsidies 14 – and thus to the concept of state aid.   
 
This conceptual framework creates an impossible position for public services which are financed through 
mixed mechanisms – as is increasingly the case. If there is any public finance provided to a publicly owned 
undertaking, then that is equivalent to state aid; but if the service involves any charges, or any contracts with 
that undertaking, then it is a service of economic interest, and in principle relevant to trade between states. 
This was noted by CEMR in their comments on the original 2004 proposals: “it seems to CEMR that the 
European Commission acts on two assumptions: Public financial contribution for services of general 
economic interest, even for services delivered by public utilities, generally constitutes state aid; [and] Public 
authorities often or in general over-compensate SGEIs.”15   
 
2.4.2. Interference with international trade 
This issue is important to the treaty provisions: 87-1 says state aid is only incompatible “insofar as it affects 
trade between Member States”, and 86-2 limits the exemption for state aid for SGEI by saying that “the 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community.”   
 
The ECJ however has made it trivially easy to meet this requirement, so that any service involving charges is 
deemed to affect trade between member states. A good illustration of this is the Altmark case itself 16, which 
concerned a bus service in the Stendal region of Germany, a service which seems of only local interest, not 
subject to compulsory liberalisation under EC law, and thus, one might think, it is for the people of the 
region to decide whether they wish to open the service to private competition.  But according to the Altmark 
judgment, neither size nor local autonomy prevent it from affecting international trade: however small and 
local the service is “there is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between 
Member States is not affected”  (Altmark, para 81).   
 
As for evidence of any actual effect, the court was content to use the theoretical argument that if the bus 
company was given state aid “the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be 
maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less 
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chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State” (Altmark, para 77). It then 
claimed that this is “not merely hypothetical”  on the grounds that some transport services in some countries 
are liberalised - “as appears in particular from the observations of the Commission, several Member States 
have since 1995 started to open certain transport markets to competition from undertakings established in 
other Member States, so that a number of undertakings are already offering their urban, suburban or regional 
transport services in Member States other than their State of origin.” (Altmark, para 79).  This seems to mean 
that aid for any undertaking whatsoever can affect international trade because in theory it might help the 
undertaking do other things which in theory firms from other countries might want to compete for.  
 
The European Commission, by contrast,  has been prepared to adopt a more realistic approach, accepting  
that size does matter, and so has introduced a “de minimis” rule which effectively excludes aid below a 
certain amount from the application of articles 87 and 88 (this also has the advantage of reducing 
administrative burdens on the Commission). And the Commission has been prepared to accept that funding 
can be protected so that it does not distort competition: in June 2005 it approved state aid by France to invest 
in a new international TV channel.  It decided that the project was SGEI, and that the investment was indeed 
state aid, but that it was not distortive because “the project offered sufficient guarantees against the risk of 
distortion of competition, for example by preventing unjustified transfers of public funds to France 
Television and TF1, who will be shareholders in the future channel." 17 
2.5. Unequal playing field: private loss leaders and cross-subsidies 
The state aid rules, and the transparency requirements, are intended to prevent a public sector body from 
being able to submit tenders which are subsidized by public money, and so have an unfair advantage, 
unrelated to its merits as a contractor, over other competing private organizations.  
 
However, there is no corresponding provision to prevent the use of cross-subsidies by private sector groups. 
„Loss leaders‟ are examples of bids benefiting from such cross-subsidies, where the private group uses 
profits, taken from other contracts or other parts of the group, to part-finance the costs that would be incurred 
by the contract. Such bids are a common technique for gaining market share in some sectors, including 
services such as waste management, where there are frequently choices between public and private 
provision. This was done by all major refuse collection contractors entering the UK market under the 
Thatcher compulsory tendering regime in 1989 (and, in the other direction, by Vivendi in 2000, when it 
loaded all the debts of its acquisitions in telecoms and media onto its existing concessions in water, waste 
and other public services).  
 
Yet the twin rationales for state aid rules – to avoid distorting competition, and to promote greater efficiency 
in public expenditure decisions – both apply just as strongly against loss leaders by the private sector. 
Equivalent provisions could require publication by companies of separate accounts for all contracts obtained 
as a result of public tenders, which would also improve public accountability, or enable public authorities to 
examine company books.  
2.6. Encouraging state aid for PPPs 
One current problem of state aid which is not addressed by the current package is the problem of state 
guarantees providing financial comfort to private companies involved in public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
such as the projects under the UK‟s private finance initiative (PFI).  The EC‟s silence on this issue is 
surprising, as it is a growing area of public finance in relation to commercial companies with obvious risks of 
distorting competition and the provision of public services. The EC‟s silence is also in contrast to the 
concerns expressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has warned that government 
guarantees for PPPs are an extra burden on public finance and may often involve „over-compensation‟ : 
“….resort to guarantees to secure private financing can expose the government to hidden and often higher 
costs than traditional public financing… it is also possible that the government overprices risk and 
overcompensates the private sector for taking it on, which would raise the cost of PPPs relative to direct 
public investment”1. 
                                                     
1 International Monetary Fund Public-Private Partnerships March 12, 2004 p.14 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.htm 
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The EC is certainly aware of this problem and the relevance of the state aid provisions. In 2004 the EC ruled 
that Poland‟s proposed compensation to private electricity generating companies for abolishing over-
expensive power purchase agreements (PPAs) was illegal state aid.18  According to the EC the compensation 
was unjustifiable because the PPAs themselves were unacceptable forms of state aid, providing long-term 
government guarantees - for 20 years or more - above and beyond any reasonable market arrangement. The 
electricity companies thus gained a significant commercial advantage from these PPAs: “evidenced by the 
fact that they could borrow as much as €5 billion from financial institutions. This tends to indicate that these 
institutions considered that, although the PPAs could not be qualified as guarantees in a legal meaning, they 
constituted securities from the economic point of view, as the operators had the certainty granted by the State 
to recover a fixed amount of money during a very long term.” 19 
 
The silence may be explained by the EC‟s desire to encourage PPPs. This has been clear for a number of 
years: Commissioner Bolkestein, in a speech on PPPs 20 in November 2002, in which he stated that EU 
legislation needed to be reviewed to facilitate the greater role of the private sector in public services. A paper 
on PPPs produced, by DG Regio in 2003,  relating to PPPs in the accession countries in water and transport, 
sought simply to set out ways in which public finance – especially from the EC‟s own funds – could be used 
in PPPs. 21  In 2004 a conference was organised in Frankfurt to discuss the role of government grants as a 
source of finance for PPPs, where the development banks, businesses and EC representatives shared a 
common objective of trying to ensure that some of the expected €22billion available to new member states 
between 2005 and 2007 would be available to PPPs.  
 
3. The EC package 
The package of proposals includes three elements:  
 the State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005-
2009       
 Draft Commission Decision on the application of Article 86(2) of the Treaty to State aid in the form 
of public service compensation granted to  certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest  
 Community Framework for State Aid in the Form of Public Service Compensation 
All documents are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/ 
 
The decision effectively sets out the conditions under which state aid for SGEI is automatically acceptable, 
and does not have to be pre-notified, and is not subject to the conditions laid down in the Altmark judgment.  
All other state aid for SGEI is deemed to be state aid and has to be pre-notified unless it satisfies the Altmark 
criteria as interpreted by the EC in the framework. 
3.1. Action plan 
The structure of the Action Plan provides a move away from ad hoc decision-making by the EC towards 
creating a system of rules which are better known and more consistent. The impact on services of general 
economic interest (SGEI) is now covered under two broad headings: guidelines and framework, and specific 
exemptions (see diagram).  The framework category is shared with major policy areas such as research and 
development, regional policy, and environment: the block exemptions category also includes aid for small 
and medium enterprises, training and employment. This is a helpful development because it enables 
discussion of the general principles which make SGEI special, and also allows for services which would be 
damaged by application of the state aid rules to be protected by specific measures. 
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However, the framework presents some key principles which remain problematic for the financing of public 
services. These principles include: an overall aim to reduce state aid; a general commitment to preferring 
market mechanisms to public finance; and the proposed use of „market failure‟ as a core criterion for 
deciding if state aid is justified. While the document as a whole is clearly focussed on the context of 
industrial policy, the principles nevertheless have wider implications for public service financing. 
 
The first of these is apparent in the title of the framework – “less and better targeted state aid”, which 
announces a general commitment to reducing the use of public finance subsidies. The paper justifies this by 
reference to the European Council decisions: “The European Council of March 2005 has called on Member 
States to continue working towards a reduction in the general level of State aid, while making allowance for 
any market failures.” (para 14), but this cannot be allowed to imply a general objective for reducing public 
finance for public services.  
 
The second problematic principle is the use the concept of market failures in assessing whether state aid is 
justified and the best solution available:  “One key element is the analysis of market failures, such as 
externalities, imperfect information or coordination problems, which may be reasons why the markets do not 
achieve desired objectives of common interest, in particular if they are of an economic nature. In those cases, 
identifying the market failure at stake will help evaluate better whether state aid could be justified and 
acceptable, would represent the most appropriate solution, and how it should be implemented to achieve the 
desired objective without distorting competition and trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.” 
(para 23).  
 
However, it is extremely contentious to identify market failures as the only legitimate grounds for the use of 
public finance – a large literature, and a large body of political argument, indicates that this is not accepted as 
a general limitation on the justifications for public spending on a service. 
   
The third problem arises with the assumption that public finance is always an inferior solution. The 
framework states this quite explicitly:  “Before resorting to State aid, which is in general only the second best 
option to achieve optimal allocation of resources, it should be verified whether other less distortive measures 
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could remedy the market failure.” (para 23). Once again, in the area of public services, this position is highly 
contentious, both analytically and politically: in areas such as health services for example there is 
overwhelming evidence that systems based on public finance are both more efficient and effective than 
systems based on markets. Indeed, the EC itself is clearly aware of the range of arguments on this issue: the 
green paper on services of general interest included an interesting section discussing the principles of public 
financing, including solidarity: “Other relevant criteria for selecting a financing mechanism, such as its 
efficiency or its redistributive effects, are currently not taken into account in Community legislation. Neither 
have the effects of the selected mechanism on the long-term investment of providers of services and 
infrastructure and on security of supply been specifically considered….” 22 
3.2. The decision  
The decision sets out proposed criteria for exemption form the state aid rules. These fall into two categories: 
„de minimis‟ conditions, and specific sectoral rules, which provide specific exemption for support for 
hospitals, social housing, and some air and sea transport subsidies.  
 
The de minimis proposals (paras 14 and 15) are justified on the grounds that small-scale services do not 
affect inter-state trade. The limits are set low, however: annual turnover of €100million, or aid of €30million, 
and would still mean that many local public services would be subject to justification under the Altmark 
criteria.  
 
The specific exemptions are made for “Hospitals and undertakings in charge of social housing… if the 
services performed are qualified as services of general economic interest by the Member States.” (para 16). 
There is no clear justification for why this list is so limited: it could be extended much more widely to many 
more public services. Indeed, its own internal criterion implies a much wider and simpler principle, which 
would simply exempt all services which “are qualified as services of general economic interest by the 
Member States”.  
 
Moreover, the exemptions are made conditional on a list of requirements which themselves echo the Altmark 
criteria, requiring specification of  the nature and the duration of the public service obligations, the  
undertakings and territory concerned; the nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the 
undertaking; the parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the compensation; and the 
arrangements for avoiding and repaying any overcompensation (article 4).  This imposes an administrative 
burden which seems especially inappropriate for services exempted under a de minimis rule, and the 
requirements are analogous to the specifications required for tendering under the procurement procedures, 
thus opening the possibility that the exemptions will apply automatically if the work is tendered, but only 
subject to administrative efforts if it is not tendered.  
3.3. The framework 
The framework document is of great interest, in the light of the continuing debate about the need for a 
framework directive on services of general interest. Such a framework could resolve the many problems 
involved in the interface between public services and the competition and market rules of the EU.  However, 
the framework proposed by the EC has a much narrower function, and is in effect an extended application of 
the Altmark criteria. 
 
There is a correct acknowledgement that “with the exception of the sectors where there are 
Community rules governing the matter, Member States have a wide margin of discretion 
regarding the nature of services that could be classified as being services of general economic interest.” (para 
2.2) This could be built on to construct a framework based on the principle of subsidiarity that decisions by 
competent authorities which would be automatically valid, but the EC appears to be reluctant to allow such 
general powers and claims, somewhat contradictorily, a residual power for the Commission even in this area: 
“the Commission‟s task is to ensure that these provisions are applied without manifest error as regards 
definition of SGEIs”. This power is not clear and could lead to considerable confusion.  
 
The rest of the proposals consist of a broad endorsement of the Altmark principles. As noted below, these  
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requirements to specify the precise nature of the obligations, the parameters for calculating the 
compensation, and demonstration that the compensation is reasonable by reference to a „typical‟ undertaking, 
are all requirements which would be met almost by default if a service is subject to open competitive tender, 
and requires an equivalent amount of administrative work if not tendered.  
 
4. Future possibilities: compulsory tendering or special status for public services 
The proposals clearly recognize that some broad exemptions of scale of sector need to be made to protect 
public services, but equally continue with the perspective that competitive markets are best for SGEI also. 
Beyond an assessment of the practical effects of these proposals they can be seen as raising the possibility of 
two different ways forward.  
 
One core thrust of the proposals, and the judgments and decisions which preceded them, is that all problems 
can be avoided if all service delivery is submitted to tender.  
 
The alternative approach is to give stronger weight to the subsidiarity principle, and give precedence to the 
decisions on public services made by public authorities.   
4.1. Requiring tendering 
The paradigm now being used is that of competitive tendering under the procurement directives. The 
Altmark judgment itself specified that the fourth criterion – demonstrating the reasonableness of the state 
subsidy – is automatically fulfilled if the service has been subjected to competitive tender; if not it has to 
demonstrate that it is as efficient as a „well-run company‟, which is an uncertain requirement. The effect is 
that there is a very strong incentive for public authorities to submit every subsidized service to tender, 
because that is the simplest way of meeting the Altmark criterion. Otherwise, the EU institutions effectively 
impose substantial transaction costs on a public authority, to justify the level of aid by reference to some 
benchmarking criteria, which may be further subjected to scrutiny by the EC.  
 
The Altmark decision makes competitive tendering even more attractive because the procurement process 
effectively ensures that the first two criteria are met as well:  the definition of the public service obligation 
(condition 1) has to be made as part of a contract specification; the advance specification of the calculation 
of subsidy have to be specified (condition 2) in order to obtain comparable tenders. Altmark‟s third 
condition, concerning proportionality of the aid, may also be most simply demonstrated through competitive 
tendering, arguing that the competitive process will always effectively discount any excess and return it to 
the public authority or to users of the service through lower charges.  
 
The Altmark conditions is part of a long line of EC proposals to make competitive tendering more normal 
and increase the practical pressures on public authorities to tender services by default as a way of gaining 
validity.  In its Laeken report on services of general interest, the EC suggested that aid would be deemed 
compatible if “a service of general economic interest was attributed as a result of a fair, transparent and 
non-discriminatory procedure…provided that the procedure was effectively competitive” and that a criterion 
for compatibility “could be the provision of a service of general economic interest attributed in a fair, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitive tendering procedure.” 23 This not only conforms with the 
ideological norms of current policies, but is also, as suggested by one commentator, an extremely convenient 
way of relieving the Commission of investigative work. 24         
 
Further pressure for tendering has come since, from a number of sources. In the 2004 green paper on PPPs, 
the Commission gratuitously claimed (para 63) that work has to be submitted to compulsory tendering before 
it can be assigned to arms-length public entities, asserting that: “Only entities that fulfil these two conditions 
at the same time [subject to the same kind of control as an in-house entity, and carrying out the essential 
part of its work for the authority] may be treated as equivalent to "in-house" entities in relation to the 
contracting body and have tasks entrusted to them without a competitive procedure.”    
 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
19/07/2010  Page 10 of 15  
  
The ECJ also uses competitive tendering as a key indicator of whether SGEI can claim exemption under 86-
2.  According to a 2005 judgment concerning the Swedish pharmacy system, state aid for SGEI “cannot be 
justified under Article 86(2) EC in the absence of a selection system that excludes any discrimination against 
medicinal preparations from other Member States”,  and so ruled against a purchasing system because it  
“makes no provision for a purchasing plan or for a system of „calls for tenders‟ within the framework of 
which producers whose products are not selected would be entitled to be apprised of the reasons for the 
selection decision.”   25 
 
The report on state aid prepared by the rapporteur to the European Parliament also proposed that competitive 
tendering become the only criterion for exemption from the state aid rules. This was strongly opposed by 
organisations representing municipalities, cities, public service operators and public service unions; CEMR 
stated that:  “By calling for compulsory tendering to be the exclusive criterion in order to be exempt from the 
state aid regime, the Parliament makes the European Commission‟s proposal totally meaningless since this 
proposal only aims to cover cases where no tender has taken place” 26, and EuroCities, CEEP and EPSU 
warned that the proposal “exceeds the provisions of Community law and goes against the principle of local 
self-government”27.  This opposition was successful, in that the proposal was not in fact adopted by the 
Commission. The current proposals may nevertheless create a similar powerful pressure in the same 
direction, because tendering is such an attractive alternative to becoming embroiled in a state aid case.  
 
The pressures for greater tendering have been characterised as part of a general ideological shift in the 
structure of the state in relation to public services: “Traditionally, the function of the state as a public service 
provider has been linked with ownership of the relevant assets. The integral characteristics of privately 
financed projects reveal the degree that the state and its organs are prepared to drift….. towards 
contractualised governance”28  One problem with this process is that private companies may end up with 
substantial powers in services of general interest, and then escape the regulation that is imposed on public 
authorities. In such cases, the ECJ has begun to rule that even private companies should be treated as public 
authorities for the purpose of the procurement rules, for example, because the functions they were carrying 
out were functions of general interest specified by the state. 
29
  In developing these arguments, the ECJ is at 
least recognising that the objectives and functions of public services make a difference to the legal rules 
which should be applied.  
4.2. Public interest objectives and choices 
The EC claims that it is treating public and private sectors equally by ensuring that each can compete on 
equal terms for the same contracts.  This ignores however a fundamental difference between public 
authorities and private companies, recognized by EC law in the procurement directives, in which a ’body 
governed by public law’ means any body: (a) established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the 
general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character.30 Such public bodies may secondarily 
operate commercially, looking for business in competition with private companies, but remain defined by 
their primary objective of meeting needs in the general interest. 
   
Equality of treatment should therefore properly mean equality of status for these public interest objectives, so 
that public authorities are free to decide the best way of achieving those objectives, including the higher level 
choice of whether to use contract or control procedures. One way of establishing this point is to seek to 
establish a distinction between, on the one hand,  services of general interest (SGI) which are not economic, 
but are designed to meet the „general interest‟ objectives of public bodies; and, on the other hand, services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) as defined in the EU treaty.   This involves maintaining a difficult dividing 
line, as noted in a research paper for the European parliament in 2005: “Any given activity may be carried 
out either as a private service or as a public service e.g. teaching, surgery; and public services may be 
delivered through a range of different modalities, including both commercial and noncommercial 
operations; so neither the activity nor the modality is capable of being used alone to define the scope of SGI 
in the EU.” 31    
 
In view of these problems, the core concept of the public or general interest could be reinstated at the centre 
of the issue, so that the rules for avoiding competition being distorted by state aid should be restricted to 
sectors outside those which have been decided to be of such public importance as to require public services, 
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and so: “The starting point should be the concept of the general interest as defined collectively (politically) 
through democratic processes by public authorities in the Member States.”  32 
4.3. General exemption for public policy objectives? 
The simplest approach would thus be to provide a general exemption for state aid which is provided as part 
of any public service in pursuit of public policy.  
 
This is the clear view expressed in a number of responses to the consultation on the EC white paper on 
services of general interest.33 The Association Of The Provinces Of The Netherlands proposed that: “a block 
exemption for regional and local services will be helpful here. In view of their regional and local character, 
these services are not, or hardly ever, distorting trade between Member States.” ; the UK‟s Local 
Government International Bureau  argued that: “reasonable financial assistance for genuine social purposes, 
whether delivered by an SGEI or an SGI, is acceptable, and needs to be excluded from the state aids 
regime…..” and proposed as a new rule that “the provisions of the constitution in relation to competition and 
state aids shall not apply to the provisions of SGIs and SGEIs save to the extent necessary to combat 
breaches of the principles of proper operation and delivery of such services.” .    
 
In fact, the EU has already agreed to the application of such a broad provision, in the context of its trade 
agreement with South Africa. That agreement incorporates a restriction on state aid, in order to ensure a level 
playing field in commercial trade, in terms which are very close to the wording of article 87 but with a 
crucial further addition:    
 
“Insofar as it may affect trade between the [European] Community and South Africa,  public aid 
favouring certain firms or the production of certain goods, which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition, and which does not support a specific public policy objective or objectives of either 
party, is incompatible with the proper functioning of this  agreement”[emphasis added]34.   
 
This creates a very simple and general criterion which protects public expenditure in pursuit of public policy 
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Annexe 1. Treaty text 
 
 Article 86 (ex Article 90) 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any 
measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for 
in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89. 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or 
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained 
in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules 
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. 
The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the 
interests of the Community. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, 
where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. 
 
 Article 87 (ex Article 92) 
1.Ú Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market. 
2.Ú The following shall be compatible with the common market: 
(a)Ùaid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is 
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected 
by the division of Germany, insofar as such aid is required in order to compensate for the 
economic disadvantages caused by that division. 
3.Ú The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: 
(a)Ùaid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest; 
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common 
interest; 
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 
 
 
 Article 88 (ex Article 93) 
1.Ú The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant review 
all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate 
measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common 
market. 
Treaty establishing the European Community 73 
2.Ú If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission 
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finds that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the 
common market having regard to Article 87, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide 
that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be 
determined by the Commission. 
If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the 
Commission or any other interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 
226 and 227, refer the matter to the Court of Justice direct. 
On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid 
which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the 
common market, in derogation from the provisions of Article 87 or from the regulations 
provided for in Article 89, if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. If, as 
regards the aid in question, the Commission has already initiated the procedure provided for 
in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made its 
application to the Council shall have the effect of suspending that procedure until the Council 
has made its attitude known. 
If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known within three months of the said 
application being made, the Commission shall give its decision on the case. 
3.Ú The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, 
of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the 
common market having regard to Article 87, it shall without delay initiate the procedure 
provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures 
into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision. 
Article 89 (ex Article 94) 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may make any appropriate regulations for the application 
of Articles 87 and 88 and may in particular determine the conditions in which Article 88(3) 
shall apply and the categories of aid exempted from this procedure. 
 
 Article 73 (ex Article 77) 
Aids shall be compatible with this Treaty if they meet the needs of coordination of transport or if they 
represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service. 
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